On Friday, April 18 at 12noon in SL 104:

Algorithmic Confusion Analysis of Higher Order DPA against Masking Protected Devices
Presenter: Adam Ding (Northeastern University)

Abstract:
Masking the internal operations with random numbers is a popular countermeasure to protect cryptographic systems against differential power analysis (DPA). Higher order DPA can be used to break the masking protection. We apply the algorithmic confusion analysis (Fei et al. 2012 CHES) on higher order DPA. We derive an analytic success rate formula that explicitly shows the effect of the algorithmic properties, the implementation singal-noise-ratio, and masking. We also formally prove that, in the very noisy scenarios, the centered product combination function is optimal for the higher-order attacks.

Bio:
Adam Ding is an associate professor in the Mathematics Department of Northeastern University. He received his Ph.D. degree from Cornell University. His research focus on statistical methodology and applications in biostatistics, engineering and finance. He had hold summer visiting faculty positions in the Biostatistics Departments of Harvard University and University of Rochester. Recently, he is building statistical models for evaluating side-channel-attacks against cryptosystems.

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.

All are welcome!

For current information on the seminar, please visit:

http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


On Wednesday, April 16 at 11 am in AK 219:

Sub-Transistor Level Hardware Trojans

Presenter: Christof Paar (Ruhr-Universität Bochum & UMASS Amherst)

Abstract:
Countless systems ranging from consumer electronics to military equipment are dependent on integrated circuits (ICs). A surprisingly large number of such systems are already security critical, e.g., medical devices, automotive electronics, or SCASA systems. If the underlying ICs in such applications are maliciously manipulated through hardware Trojans, the security of the entire system can be compromised. In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community. Initially, the primary attacker model of concern had been that a malicious foundry could alter the design, i.e., introduce hardware Trojans that could interfere with the (security-sensitive) functionality of a chip. Many other attacker models exist too. For instance, the legitimate owner of an IC, e.g., a consumer electronic company abroad, might be in cohort with a foreign intelligence agency and could decide to alter its products in a way that compromises its security. Even though hardware Trojans have drawn considerable attention by the scientific community, little is known about how Trojans might look, especially those that are particularly designed to avoid detection.

In this talk we propose an extremely stealthy approach for realizing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to many detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against “golden chips”. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into the digital post-processing used in Intel’s cryptographically secure random number generator used in the Ivy Bridge processors.

Bio:
Christof Paar started his career at WPI, where he taught from 1995 to 2001. Since then he has the Chair for Embedded Security at the University of Bochum, Germany, and is affilated professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He co-founded, with Cetin Koc, the CHES (Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems) conference. Christof’s research interests include highly efficient software and hardware realizations of cryptography, physical security, penetration of real-world systems, trusted systems and cryptanalytical hardware. He also works on real-world applications of embedded security, e.g., in cars, consumer devices, smart cards and RFID.

Christof has over 150 peer-reviewed publications and is co-author of the textbook Understanding Cryptography (Springer, 2009). He has given invited talks at MIT, Yale, Stanford University, IBM Labs and Intel. He has taught cryptography extensively in industry, including courses at General Dynamics, NASA, Motorola Research, and Philips Research. Christof is Fellow of the IEEE. He co-founded ESCRYPT Inc. – Embedded Security, a leading system provider in industrial security which was acquired by Bosch.

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.

All are welcome!

For current information on the seminar, please visit:

http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) invites applications for a faculty position in the Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering at all ranks, commensurate with qualifications.

Required qualifications for the position include; an earned Ph.D. in Electrical & Computer Engineering, or a closely related field. Areas of particular interest include, but are not limited to: security engineering, hardware and embedded systems security, and mobile and cyber-physical systems security.

The successful candidate will be expected to establish and maintain a
high quality, self-sustaining research program. WPI offers ample opportunity for collaboration with current department faculty as well as appropriate cross-campus, interdisciplinary research groups in various topics in security. In addition to excellence in teaching and research, candidates should look forward to engaging undergraduate and graduate students in a classroom and projects intensive environment, and expanding our graduate research program.

Qualified applicants should submit a detailed curriculum vitae, a brief statement of specific teaching and research objectives, and four letters of recommendation at least one of which addresses teaching experience or potential, via https://careers.wpi.edu/. Review of applications will continue until the position is filled.

More Information: https://careers.wpi.edu/postings/1124


Thursday, Dec. 12 at 4 pm in AK-219:
Presenter: Prof. Erkay Savas (Sabanci University)

Abstract:
Cache attacks are shown to be effective side-channel attacks that use cache access patterns of a cryptographic algorithm during execution. The cryptographic algorithms using lookup table approach for acceleration are especially vulnerable to cache attacks. Depending on the available information that we can gather about cache activity during cryptographic operations, we can classify cache attacks into three major groups: access-based, trace-based and timing based. All the attack types, which are successfully demonstrated in each category in the literature, rely on a spy process that runs concurrently to the cryptographic process and creates collisions in the cache memory. A fourth type of attack which does not rely on a spy process, exploits naturally occurring collisions in the cache and can be applied remotely. In this talk, we will give an overview of all types of cache attacks and explain how they work and to what extent they will be a threat. We also discuss several countermeasures that can be deployed against the cache attacks. We will discuss a lightweight technique to locate a spy process on which many attacks seem to be relying for generating cache collisions with cryptographic process. We also discuss a technique to find the cause(s) of naturally occurring cache collisions which are exploited in certain types of attacks.

Bio:
Erkay Savaş received the BS (1990) and MS (1994) degrees in electrical engineering from the Electronics and Communications Engineering Department at Istanbul Technical University. He completed the Ph.D. degree in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) at Oregon State University in June 2000. He had worked for various companies and research institutions before he joined Sabanci University as an assistant professor in 2002. He is the director of the Cryptography and Information Security Group (CISec) of Sabanci University. His research interests include cryptography, data and communication security, privacy in biometrics, trusted computing, security and privacy in data mining applications, embedded systems security, and distributed systems. He is a member of IEEE, ACM, the IEEE Computer Society, and the International Association of Cryptologic Research (IACR).

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.
All are welcome!
For current information on the seminar, please visit:

http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


Thursday, Nov. 14 at 4 pm in AK-219:
Beehive: Large-Scale Log Analysis for Detecting Suspicious Activity in Enterprise Networks
Presenter: Dr. Alina Oprea (RSA Laboratories)

Abstract:
Currently, many organizations keep large volumes of log data collected by various security products. This data is mostly used today for forensic analysis once an attack has been discovered or an incident triggered through some external mechanism. We present a novel system called Beehive that mines and automatically extracts knowledge from these various data sources available in our enterprise. Beehive profiles the typical behavior of hosts over extended periods of time, extracts features representative of different aspects of host behavior and identifies hosts that deviate from normal activity. By using a behavior-based approach to detecting security incidents, Beehive improves on signature-based techniques prevalent in industry products. We have evaluated Beehive on several months of log data collected in our enterprise and show that Beehive is able to identify malicious events and policy violations within the enterprise network which would otherwise go undetected.

Bio:
Alina Oprea is a Consultant Research Scientist at RSA Laboratories, the security division of EMC. Her research interests span multiple areas in computer and communications security including data analysis for security applications, cloud and storage security, foundations of cybersecurity and detection of advanced attacks. Alina holds a B.S. degree in Mathematics and Computer Science from University of Bucharest, Romania, and has obtained M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University in 2003 and 2007, respectively. She is the recipient of the 2011 TR35 award for her research in cloud security.

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.
All are welcome!
For current information on the seminar, please visit:

http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


On Wednesday, Nov. 6 at 3 pm in AK 233:
Enabling Practical Secure Computing through Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Presenter: Dr. Kurt Rohloff (Raytheon BBN Technologies)

Abstract:
The first major breakthrough of theoretical computer science in the 21st century was the discovery of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). This breakthrough has provided the possibility for secure computation on encrypted data without requiring the sharing of encryption keys. When first discovered, early FHE implementations were 7+ orders of magnitude too slow to be of practical use. In this talk we’ll review our recent advances in practical implementations of FHE, with a particular focus on practical trade-offs associated with building and using these technologies and example use cases ranging from encrypted e-mail spam filtering and encrypted VOIP.

Bio:
Dr. Kurt Rohloff is a senior scientist in the Distributed Systems research group at BBN Technologies. Dr. Rohloff’s areas of technical expertise include secure computing, practical encryption, scalable distributed computing and graph data analytics. Dr. Rohloff is the Principal Investigator for the SIPHER team in the DARPA PROCEED program developing a practical FHE implementation in both software and commodity FPGA hardware. Dr. Rohloff was the Principal Investigator on the AFRL SCIMITAR project which resulted in the demonstration of a best-of-breed highly scalable cloud-based information brokering capability. Dr.
Rohloff is the Chief Designer and Lead Architect of the SHARD triple-store, a highly scalable storage system and query engine for graph data. Dr. Rohloff received his Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering from Georgia Tech and his Master’s and PhD. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Michigan. Dr. Rohloff did a post-doc at the UIUC Coordinated Sciences Laboratory.

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.

All are welcome!

For current information on the seminar, please visit:

http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


On Wednesday, Sept. 25 at 10 am in AK 233
Tim Güneysu (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany) will talk on:

Advances in Implementations of Code-based Cryptography on Embedded Systems

Abstract:
Recent public-key schemes are either based on the factorization or the discrete logarithm problem. Since both problems are closely related, a major breakthrough in cryptanalysis (e.g., with the advent of quantum computing will render nearly all currently employed security system useless. Code-based public-key schemes rely on the alternative security assumption that decoding generic linear binary codes is NP-complete. Two code-based schemes for public-key encryption are available due to McEliece and Niederreiter. This talk highlights the latest advances in implementations of code-based cryptography for embedded systems and demonstrates that efficient alternatives to classical asymmetric public-key schemes are already available today.

Bio:
Prof. Tim Güneysu is the head of the research group on Hardware Security, whose major research topics are cryptographic and cryptanalytic implementations and systems, targeting reconfigurable devices in particular. He co-developed the COPACOBANA FPGA cluster system establishing a cost-efficient platform to perform a large variety of different cryptanalytic applications,- now sold by a spin-off company Sciengines GmbH that he co-founded. Tim published and contributed to more than 45 peer-reviewed journal and conference publications in the area of reconfigurable devices, IT-security and cryptography.

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.

All are welcome!

For current information on the seminar, please visit:
http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


On Thursday, Sept. 19 at 10 am in AK 233,
Christof Paar (Ruhr-Universität Bochum & UMASS Amherst) will talk on:

Embedded Security for the Internet of Things

Abstract:
Through the prevalence of interconnected embedded systems, the vision of ubiquitous computing has become reality over the last few years. As part of this development, embedded security has become an increasingly important issue in a multitude of applications. Examples include the Stuxnet virus, which has allegedly delayed the Iranian nuclear program, killer applications in the consumer area like iTunes or Amazon’s Kindle (the business models of which rely heavily on IP protection) and even medical implants like pace makers and insulin pumps that allow remote configuration. These examples show the destructive and constructive aspects of modern embedded security. In this presentation I will talk about some of our research projects over the last few years which dealt with both the constructive and “penetration testing” aspect of embedded security applications.

The first case study addresses a new and increasingly important area of embedded security research, namely lightweight cryptography. PRESENT is one of the smallest known ciphers which can be realized with as few as 1000 gates. The cipher was designed for extremely cost and power constrained applications such as RFID tags which can be used, e.g., as a tool for anti-counterfeiting of spare parts, or for other low-power applications. PRESENT is currently being standardized as ISO/IEC 29192.

As “destructive” examples of our research we will show how two devices with very large deployment in the real world can be broken. First, we show how a combination of embedded reverse engineering and classical symmetric cryptanalysis lead to the break of two widely deployed satellite standards. The second attack breaks the bit stream encryption of current FPGAs. These are reconfigurable hardware devices which are popular in many embedded systems, ranging from set-top boxes to high-speed routers. We were able to extract AES and 3DES key from a single power-up of the reconfiguration process. Once the key has been recovered, an attacker can clone, reverse engineer and alter a presumingly secure hardware design.

Bio:
Christof Paar was with WPI’s ECE department from 1995 until 2001. Since then he has the Chair for Embedded Security at the University of Bochum, Germany, and is affiliated professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He co-founded, with Cetin Koc, the CHES (Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems) conference. Christof’s research interests include highly efficient software and hardware realizations of cryptography, physical security, penetration of real-world systems, trusted systems and cryptanalytical hardware. He also works on real-world applications of embedded security, e.g., in cars, consumer devices, smart cards and RFID.

Christof has over 150 peer-reviewed publications and is co-author of the textbook Understanding Cryptography (Springer, 2009). He has given invited talks at MIT, Yale, Stanford University, IBM Labs, and Intel. He has taught cryptography extensively in industry, including courses at GTE, Motorola Research, NASA and Philips Research. Christof is Fellow of the IEEE. He co-founded ESCRYPT Inc. – Embedded Security, a leading system provider in industrial security which was acquired by Bosch in 2012.

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.

All are welcome!

For current information on the seminar, please visit:
http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


On Tuesday, Sept. 17 at 10 am in AK 233
Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez (CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico) will talk on:

On the complexity of computing discrete logarithms in the field GF(3^{6·509})

Abstract:
In 2013, Joux, and then Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thomé, presented new algorithms for computing discrete logarithms in finite fields of small and medium characteristic. In this talk we show how to combine these new algorithms to compute discrete logarithms over the finite field GF(3^{6·509}) = GF(3^3054) at a significantly lower complexity than previously thought possible. Our concrete analysis shows that the supersingular elliptic curve over GF(3^509) with embedding degree 6 that had been widely considered for implementing pairing-based cryptosystems at the 128-bit security level, in fact provides only a considerably lower level of security.
This is a joint work with Gora Adj, Alfred Menezes and Thomaz Oliveira.

Bio:
Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez received the BSc degree in electrical engineering from the University of Puebla, México, in 1989, the MSc degree in electrical and computer engineering from the National Institute of Astrophysics, Optics and Electronics (INAOE), Mexico, in 1992, and the PhD degree in electrical and computer engineering from Oregon State University, in 2000. Currently, he is an associate professor at the Computer Science Department of CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico City, México, which he joined in 2002. His major research interests are in cryptography and
finite field arithmetic.

Applied Cryptology Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.

All are welcome!

For current information on the seminar, please visit:
http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/


On Wednesday, Sept. 11 at 1 pm in AK 219
Amir Moradi (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) will talk on:

SIDE-CHANNEL COUNTERMEASURES FOR HARDWARE:
IS THERE A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

Abstract:
Counteracting side-channel attacks (DPA), known as a serious threat to
cryptographic devices, is a must for today’s security-related products.
Due to the less control over the device internals compared to software
dealing with DPA countermeasures in hardware is more challenging. This
talk denotes the practical problems when implementing DPA
countermeasures in hardware. It continues with a couple of examples as
well as their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. At the end we conclude
whether we can provide the desired level of DPA resistance by solely
implementing a countermeasure.

Bio:
Amir Moradi received the PhD degrees in computer engineering from Sharif
University of Technology, Iran, in 2008. Since 2009, he has been a
postdoctoral researcher at the Embedded Security group, Horst Görtz
Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. His research
interests include the areas of side-channel attacks, countermeasures,
and implementation of cryptographic algorithms.

Cyber Security Seminar
The seminar features presentations of hot topics within the
interdisciplinary field of cyber-security.

All are welcome!

For current information on the seminar, please visit:
http://ecewp.ece.wpi.edu/wordpress/vernam/seminars/